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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Tia Satcher was convicted of grand theft of lost property in 
the form of a purse and a financial transaction card contained within that purse. As a 
preliminary matter, Ms. Satcher asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the State's charge in this case. In addition, she asserts numerous other trial errors that, 
individually and cumulatively, demonstrate that she did not receive a fair trial and 
therefore, reversal of her conviction is required. 
During her trial, the prosecutor was allowed to question - over Ms. Satcher's 
repeated objections - a police officer multiple times about whether, in his training and 
experience, he believed that Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of the 
charged offense. The district court was alerted to the improper nature of this 
questioning, but ruled that it was admissible because the officer's opinion as to 
Ms. Satcher's truthfulness would assist the jury as the trier of fact in this case. As a 
component of this ruling, the district court also expressly ruled that it did not, and could 
not, make a determination as to whether the detective was qualified to testify as an 
expert at trial. The trial court did so because the court believed the jury had to make 
this determination. 
Ms. Satcher asserts that the district's erroneous admission of the testimony of a 
police officer as to his opinion of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness and credibility was 
reversible error. She also asserts that the prosecutor in this case committed 
misconduct when he deliberately questioned the police officer on these matters. 
In addition, the district court admitted evidence of a restitution order from a prior 
criminal case under the rubric of I.R.E. 609 - which only permits the introduction of 
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evidence of a prior felony criminal conviction, and only permits the introduction of such 
evidence for matters of the general credibility of a witness. This prior restitution order 
was not on its face evidence of a prior felony conviction, and was not admitted by the 
district court to show anything related to Ms. Satcher's general credibility. The purpose 
for which the court deemed the restitution order to be admissible was to show 
Ms. Satcher's propensity. Because this restitution order was not admissible under the 
rule relied upon by the district court, and was not admissible under the rules of evidence 
for the purpose articulated by the court, admission of this evidence was reversible error. 
Finally, Ms. Satcher asserts that even if the errors in her case were not deemed 
to require reversal individually, the cumulative effect of these errors demonstrates that 
she did not receive a fair trial. Accordingly, under the cumulative error doctrine, reversal 
is required. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Tia Satcher was charged with grand theft of lost property in the form of a financial 
transaction card. (R., pp.33-34.) This charge was based on the allegation that, on 
December 24, 2008, Ms. Satcher had taken and used a credit card from the purse of a 
woman, Danielle Ostolasa-Mendiola, who had forgotten to retrieve her purse from a 
shopping cart and left the purse behind. (Prelim. Tr. 1, p.6, L.11 - p.11, L.8) 
Ms. Satcher actually called Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola and informed her that Ms. Satcher 
had found the purse with several items strewn about the parking lot beside it. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.11, Ls.1-8.) Ms. Satcher was calling so that she could return the purse. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.11, Ls.1-8.) However, within minutes of this call, Ms. Ostolasa-lVlendiola was 
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contacted by phone by a Boise police officer who informed her that he believed some 
items from her purse had been taken. (Prelim. Tr., p.12, L 11 - p.13, L. 14.) After 
calling her credit card company, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola was told that one of her credit 
cards had been used after she had left her purse behind in the shopping cart. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.14, Ls.2-25.) 
The State's first witness at trial was Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.176, 
Ls.8-11.) She testified that, on the day in question, she was shopping at a local 
Walmart store, and that she was by herself. (Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.4-18.) According to 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's testimony, she placed her purse - which contained her wallet, 
several credit cards, and checks - in the shopping cart. (Trial Tr., p.178, Ls.3-1 O; p.182, 
L9 - p.183, L.18.) One of the credit cards in Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse was her 
American Express card. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.14-18.) 
After Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola finished making her purchases in the store at just 
before noon, she pushed her cart out to the side of her car and spent several minutes 
unloading her shopping bags into her car. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.3 p.179, L.1.) She did 
not recall seeing her purse in the shopping cart when she finished unloading the cart. 
(Trial Tr., p.180, L.4-p.181, L.16.) But Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola apparently believed that 
she had already put her purse inside her car, because she got into her car and drove 
home. (Trial Tr., p.181, L.17-p.182, L.8.) 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that, a couple of hours later, she received a 
phone call from Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.2-25.) Ms. Satcher apparently told 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola that she had found Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse and wanted 
1 Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease 
of reference, citations to the transcript that are made herein are made in accordance 
either with the date of the proceedings transcribed or with the nature of the proceeding. 
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to return it to her. (Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-5.) According to Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola, 
Ms. Satcher claimed during this conversation that the purse was left in a dumpster when 
Ms. Satcher found it. (Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Satcher told Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola 
that her purse still had her credit cards inside of it. (Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.14-19.) 
However, in the middle of this conversation, Ms. Satcher told Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola 
that she had to get off the phone because she was being pulled over by police. (Trial 
Tr., p.187, Ls.10-13.) 
A short time later, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola was contacted by the police. (Trial Tr., 
p.188, Ls.9-12.) An officer met with her at a nearby gas station and returned her purse. 
(Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.16-24.) Although the purse was not wet or damaged, Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola did testify that the purse, "smelled." (Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.6-7.) 
Following her discussions with police, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that she 
contacted her credit card companies to check for unauthorized charges and to cancel 
the cards. (Trial Tr., p.190, Ls.12-16.) There was one purchase that Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola asserted was unauthorized on her American Express card. (Trial Tr., p.190, 
Ls.17-23.) The sole purchase was at a gas station for approximately $25. (Trial Tr., 
p.184, Ls.9-24.) Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that she had not authorized 
Ms. Satcher to make any purchases on her American Express card. (Trial Tr., p.184, 
Ls.3-8.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that she had misplaced 
her purse on at least one prior occasion. (Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.5-10.) She also admitted 
that she had no idea that her purse was left behind until she received the phone call 
from Ms. Satcher hours later. (Trial Tr., p.199, Ls.5-8.) Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola had no 
specific recollection about her purse following the time she made her purchases on that 
4 
day. (Trial Tr., p.199, Ls.9-12.) She also admitted to testifying at the preliminary 
hearing that she had no idea whether or not her purse was still in the shopping cart at 
the time she drove away from the store. (Trial Tr., p.207, L.22 - p.208, L.3.) 
Curt Crum2 also testified for the State. He clarified that, while he works for the 
Boise Police Department, he is not actually a police officer. (Trial Tr., p.221, L.24 -
p.222, L.8.) Mr. Crum testified that, on December 24, 2008, he was working as the 
head of the Crime Prevention Office, and that he was working in that capacity with local 
merchants when his attention was drawn to Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., p.222, L.5 - p.223, 
L.8.) Mr. Crum had no information regarding Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse at the time 
that he began to follow the vehicle that Ms. Satcher was riding in. (Trial Tr., p.223, L.15 
- p.224, L.6.) 
Mr. Crum followed Ms. Satcher's vehicle from a mall parking lot to a nearby gas 
station. (Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.11-22.) He was also accompanied by other officers while 
tailing Ms. Satcher's van. (Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.8-18.) These other officers stopped 
Ms. Satcher's van in the Walmart parking lot a short time after pulling out of the gas 
station. (Trial Tr., p.230, L.19- p.231, L.11.) According to Mr. Crum's testimony, when 
Ms. Satcher got out of the van, she made a statement regarding returning the purse. 
(Trial Tr., p.231, L.22 - p.232, L.10.) Mr. Crum and the other officers questioned her 
further about the purse, and eventually retrieved it from the van that Ms. Satcher was a 
passenger in. (Trial Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.4.) 
Following Mr. Crum's testimony, the State called Sergeant Dennis Tolan from the 
Boise City Police Department to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.243, Ls.11-17.) Sergeant Tolan 
2 While Mr. Crum appears to assist local merchants with investigations of suspected 
thefts, the record in this case reflects that he is not actually a police officer and has 
never been POST certified. (Trial Tr., p.161, Ls.7-11.) 
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was the officer who initially pulled over the van that Ms. Satcher was a passenger in. 
(Trial Tr., p.245, L.2 - p.246, L.8.) At the time he stopped the van, Sergeant Tolan was 
unaware of anything involving Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's missing purse. (Trial Tr., p.247, 
L.22 - p.248, L.1.) However, upon learning about the lost purse, Sergeant Tolan was 
responsible for returning the purse to Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.10-
16.) After taking the purse directly to her, the officer stated that Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola 
confirmed that all of the contents in her purse were present and intact. (Trial Tr., p.260, 
L.19 - p.261, L.2.) 
Following Sergeant Tolan's testimony, trial proceedings concluded on the first 
day of trial. The State called another Boise City Police Officer, Detective Justin Kendall, 
to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.295, Ls.8-14.) Detective Kendall was the officer who 
interviewed Ms. Satcher regarding Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse once Ms. Satcher 
was taken to the police station. (Trial Tr., p.297, L.24 - p.296, L.18.) The detective 
acknowledged that the only person seen in a surveillance photograph buying gas -
allegedly with Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card - was the driver of the van, Robert 
Miner, who was not Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., p.306, L.16 - p.311, L.5.) 
After discussing some of Ms. Satcher's responses to questioning, including her 
denial of having ever taken or used Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card that was 
contained within the purse, the State switched gears to the officer's "expertise" in 
detecting when people are lying. (Trial Tr., p.301, L.25- p.316, L.6.) Detective Kendall 
testified that he observed several "cues" in Ms. Satcher's demeanor during questioning: 
that she appeared to have become confrontational, she rubbed her arm, she touched 
her ear, and she also touched her hair. (Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.8-23.) According to the 
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officer, he believed these to be signs of being nervous and "trying to be deceptive." 
(Trial Tr., p.316, L.8- p.317, L.18.) 
Not content to leave the officers testimony at the behavior that he observed on 
Ms. Satcher's part during the interrogation, the prosecutor then asked the officer 
directly, "Sir, based upon your training and experience as a detective in interrogation, 
was Ms. Satcher being truthful?" (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.5-7.) Ms. Satcher immediately 
objected to this question as invading the province of the jury and improperly calling 
upon one witness to testify as to the credibility of another. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.8-11.) 
The State responded that, as a trained officer, a police officer was entitled to provide an 
expert opinion as to whether another witness was lying. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.13-19.) 
The trial court, apparently believing there to be a difference between the two, 
twice sought to clarify whether the State was asking for an opinion as to Ms. Satcher's 
credibility, or was rather seeking to elicit testimony as to her truthfulness. (Trial Tr., 
p.320, L.20 - p.321, L.9.) When informed that the State was asking regarding 
Ms. Satcher's truthfulness, the district court allowed the State to proceed so long as the 
State established a "foundation" for this opinion. (Trial Tr., p.321, Ls.12-13.) 
The State then engaged in the following exchange with Detective Kendall: 
Q: Detective, you talked about some of the training and experience 
that you have in -- in performing interrogations in the years you've 
been a detective. Based on that training and experience, were you 
able to form an opinion as to whether Ms. Satcher was being 
truthful to -- with you during the state -- with the statements 
that she made to you during her interrogation with you? 
A: Yes, I was. 
Q: And did you form an opinion then? 
A: Yes 
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Q: And Judge -- Detective Kendall, what was your opinion as to 
whether Ms. Satcher was being truthful with you during the 
interrogation? 
(Trial Tr., p.321, L.15 - p.322, L.3 (emphasis added).) 
Ms. Satcher again immediately objected prior to the officer's response. As 
before, she noted to the district court that such questions were plainly impermissible as 
a comment on the credibility or truthfulness of another witness. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.6-
14.) The State responded that the jury could assess the credibility of the officer's 
assessment of Ms. Satcher's credibility, and therefore there was no problem with the 
question. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.16-22.) And the district court signed on to this rationale, 
finding that whether or not to find the detective's assessment was credible was up to the 
jury. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.23-25.) The court also found that this testimony about whether 
Ms. Satcher was lying in her version of events, "may be helpful to the jury," and 
therefore allowed Detective Kendall to respond. (Trial Tr., p.322, L.25 - p.323, L.10.) 
The State then asked the question for a third time: 
Q: Detective, what -- what opinion did you form as to whether 
Ms. Satcher was being truthful with you during the 
interrogation? 
A: I did not feel she was being truthful. 
(Trial Tr., p.323, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).) 
On cross-examination, Detective Kendall admitted that his custodial interrogation 
of Ms. Satcher lasted five or six hours and that the detective had repeatedly stated that 
he did not believe Ms. Satcher during this interview. (Trial Tr., p.324, L.14 - p.325, L.5.) 
He also admitted that it is common for people who are accused of a crime to be nervous 
in talking with police. (Trial Tr., p.327, Ls.13-20.) And it is also common for a person to 
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be upset when they are accused of a crime that they did not commit. (Trial Tr., p.327, 
Ls.17-20.) 
However, when dealing with a related issue regarding whether Ms. Satcher was 
permitted to question the police officer about how long the interrogation went on, the 
district court was careful to note the fact that the court did not qualify Detective Kendall 
as an expert. The court explained: 
Let me be clear about -- I didn't certify anybody as an expert. The --
the jury decides who's expert, who's not, whether to believe them 
and what -- and who not to believe. 
So I -- I never said to the jury, and don't intend to say to the jury, that 
this person is an expert, or is any other person [sic]. Ultimately, 
that's all jury material. They decide, they assess credibility or not. 
But I do think that the officer's -- this witness' assessment of 
whether or not the defendant was telling the truth to him on this 
occasion was helpful to the jury and was -- is within the scope of his 
training. It's up to the jury whether they -- to believe -- to be impressed 
by his training, feeling that he's got some expertise or - and, ultimately, 
his credibility. So, that was my intention and how I ruled there, and that's 
my view of the law. 
(Trial Tr., p.333, L.10 - p.334, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
During a break in the detective's testimony, the parties then took up the issue of 
whether Ms. Satcher could be impeached with two prior felony convictions if she were to 
take the stand and testify at trial. (Trial Tr., p.351, L.13 - p.352, L.6.) The district court 
ultimately ruled that the State could impeach Ms. Satcher with both prior alleged 
felonies, but that the State could not inform the jury of the nature of the second felony -
an alleged conviction for grand theft out of Canyon County that also involved Mr. Miner 
- due to the fact that the potential for prejudice of that information would substantially 
outweigh any probative value. (Trial Tr., p.351, L.13 - p.358, L.9.) 
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But the district court also ruled that the fact that Ms. Satcher had a restitution 
order in common with Mr. Miner would be admissible into evidence if Ms. Satcher were 
to take the stand and testify that she was unaware, in this case, of Mr. Miner's alleged 
use of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card to buy gas. (Trial Tr., p.358, L.25 p.370, 
L.13) Ms. Satcher pointed out - multiple times - that the restitution order arising out of 
the prior criminal case had nothing to do with the charges at issue in her current case, 
and that a restitution order had no bearing on her credibility for impeachment purposes 
under I.RE. 609. (Trial Tr., p.361, Ls.21-22; p.362, Ls.1-3; p.365, L.1 - p.366, L.7) 
Additionally, Ms. Satcher noted multiple times that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial 
and had the potential for confusing the jury under I.R.E. 403. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.18-20; 
p.363, Ls.2-1 O; p.364, Ls.19-22; p.366, Ls.2-7; p.369, L.14 - p.370, L.5.) Finally, she 
noted that this evidence was irrelevant because there was no nexus or connection 
between the prior alleged grand theft charge and her current alleged offense. (Trial Tr., 
p.364, Ls.19-22; p.365, Ls.1-4; p.366, L.25.) 
However, the district court believed this evidence to be relevant in case 
Ms. Satcher testified and, in doing so, attempted to distance herself from the actions of 
Mr. Miner in allegedly using Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card to buy gas. (Trial Tr., 
p.361, L.23 - p.374, L.14.) The court found that such evidence "might be relevant" to 
whether Ms. Satcher had knowledge that Mr. Miner might try to use a credit card in the 
purse that was left behind by Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.6-13.) 
Ms. Satcher thereafter returned to her cross-examination of Detective Kendall. 
He admitted that there was no evidence at all that Ms. Satcher had ever used any of the 
credit cards in Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse. (Trial Tr., p.380, Ls.12-14.) Following 
the detective's testimony, the State rested its case. (Trial Tr., p.398, Ls.13-14.) 
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Ms. Satcher testified in her own defense at trial. As a preliminary matter, 
Ms. Satcher admitted both to the two felonies alleged by the State in support of its I.RE. 
609 motion, as well as to the existence of a prior joint restitution order imposed on 
herself and Mr. Miner. (Trial Tr., p.404, L.14 - p.405, L.9.) Ms. Satcher then turned to 
her version of events regarding the alleged theft of the financial transaction card 
contained within Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse. 
According to Ms. Satcher's testimony, she found Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse 
in a shopping cart that was adjacent to some recycling bins that looked very much like 
trash bins in the Walmart parking lot. (Trial Tr., p.408, L.13 - p.409, L.22.) After seeing 
no one else around who the purse might have belonged to, Ms. Satcher testified that 
she took Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse into the Walmart store. (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.12-
25.) She talked to a clerk in the store about the lost purse. However, when she was 
directed to leave the purse on a counter that appeared to be unattended and that was 
surrounded by people, Ms. Satcher was concerned that this would not be a safe place 
to leave the purse and so she instead took it with her outside. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.4-
14.) 
Instead of leaving the purse unattended on a store counter, Ms. Satcher went 
outside to the parking lot and attempted to contact Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola on 
Mr. Miner's phone. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.12-22.) She testified that she found 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's phone number listed on one of the checks that was present in 
the purse. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.23-25.) Although she tried twice to call Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola, nobody answered on her first two attempts to call. (Trial Tr., p.412, L.19 -
p.413, L.11.) 
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Ms. Satcher admitted that the van in the surveillance photo showing an individual 
purchasing gas was the same van that she was riding as a passenger in. (Trial Tr., 
p.413, Ls.19-24.) However, she asserted that Mr. Miner was driving the van, and she 
could not see Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse in the van due to the fact that her dog - a 
relatively large poodle - was positioned between herself and the purse that was next to 
Mr. Miner. (Trial Tr., p.414, L.7 - p.417, L.21.) It was Mr. Miner that purchased gas at 
the gas station following Ms. Satcher finding Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse. (Trial Tr., 
p.417, Ls.22-24.) According to her testimony, Ms. Satcher and Mr. Miner did not 
discuss in any way the source of the payment for the gas. (Trial Tr., p.417, L.25 -
p.418, L.5.) 
After getting gas, Ms. Satcher was finally able to get in touch with Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola on the phone in order to return her purse. (Trial Tr., p.418, L.24 - p.419, L.2.) 
Ms. Satcher testified that she had no idea that there were any credit cards at all within 
the purse until Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola asked about them and told Ms. Satcher where 
the cards were contained inside of the purse. (Trial Tr., p.419, L.3 - p.420, L.4.) After 
attempting to arrange to return the purse, Ms. Satcher's phone conversation with Ms. 
Ostolasa-Mendiola was cut short when Mr. Miner was pulled over by police. (Trial Tr., 
p.420, L.8 - p.421, L.3.) 
Following Ms. Satcher's testimony, the defense rested. Following closing 
arguments and the instructions provided by the court, the jury found Ms. Satcher guilty 
of grand theft of stolen property. (Trial Tr., p.525, Ls.17-22; R., p.153.) Ms. Satcher 
was sentenced to ten years, with two years fixed, and the district court retained 
jurisdiction over Ms. Satcher's case. (Trial Tr., p.550, Ls.2-7; R., pp.157-159.) Prior to 
the expiration of the district court's period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed her 
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on probation for ten years. (4/18/11 Tr., p.19, L.16 - p.23, L.3; Order Suspending 
Sentence and Order of Probation, Augment.) Ms. Satcher timely appeals from her 
judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., p.161.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Was there insufficient evidence in this case to support the State's allegation of 
grand theft of lost property in the form of a financial transaction card? 
2. Did the district court err when it permitted the State, over Ms. Satcher's objection, 
to elicit testimony from a police officer as to his opinion of whether Ms. Satcher's 
denial of guilt was truthful? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he intentionally elicited testimony 
from one witness regarding his opinion of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying 
guilt of the charged offense? 
4. Did the district court err when it admitted evidence in the form of a restitution 
order under the auspices of I.R.E. 609 where the restitution order was not a 
criminal conviction and was not admitted for any purpose related to Ms. Satcher's 
credibility? 




There Was Insufficient Evidence In This Case To Support Ms. Satcher's Conviction For 
Grand Theft Of Lost Property In The Form Of A Financial Transaction Card 
A. Introduction 
The evidence in this case is insufficient to support a substantial number of the 
essential elements of the State's allegation of grand theft of lost property in the form of a 
financial transaction card. In light of this, Ms. Satcher asserts that her conviction for this 
offense must be reversed with prejudice. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction is whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510, 960 P.2d 190, 193 
(Ct. App. 1998). This Court will not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of 
the evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the 
evidence for that of the jury. Id. All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State. Id. Further, matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within the 
province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is 
insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P.2d 
1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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C. There Was Insufficient Evidence In This Case To Support Ms. Satcher's 
Conviction For Grand Theft Of Lost Property In The Form Of A Financial 
Transaction Card 
1. There Was Insufficient Evidence In This Case To Support A Finding, 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Ms. Satcher Did Not Make 
Reasonable Efforts To Return The Financial Transaction Card And The 
Purse To Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola 
The sole theory alleged for the theft charge in this case was that Ms. Satcher 
committed theft by the appropriation of lost property. (R., pp.33-34.) One of the 
essential elements for this offense is that the defendant failed to take "reasonable 
measures to restore the property to the owner." I.C. § 18-2403(2)(c). Therefore, there 
can be no criminal liability for theft regarding the failure to return lost property unless it is 
determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant who found the property 
failed to take reasonable measures to return the property to its true owner. See State v. 
Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 386 (Ct. App. 1991 ). 
The State presented no evidence to support such a finding and, in fact, all of the 
evidence in this case demonstrates just the opposite - that Ms. Satcher did make 
reasonable efforts to return Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's property to her. Ms. Satcher 
testified at trial as to the multiple efforts that she made in order to seek to return 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse, and all of its contents, to her. First, Ms. Satcher 
attempted to see if there was anyone else around who the purse may belong to when 
she initially found the purse in the Walmart parking lot so that she could return the purse 
to its owner. (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.12-16.) When she didn't see anyone around who the 
purse might belong to, Ms. Satcher then returned to the Wal mart store and attempted to 
obtain assistance from an employee there. (Trial Tr., p.410, L.21-p.411, L.14.) 
However, according to Ms. Satcher's testimony, she was merely directed by this 
employee to abandon Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse on a counter that was not 
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attended by anyone else at the time and where there were a lot of people crowded 
around the area. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.4-14.) Because she felt it was wrong to leave the 
purse unobseNed and unattended on the counter, Ms. Satcher then went outside to the 
Walmart parking lot and tried unsuccessfully - twice - to call Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola on 
Mr. Miner's phone after locating Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's phone number from a check 
within the purse. (Trial Tr., p.411, L.12- p.413, L.9.) 
On Ms. Satcher's third attempt, she was able to get in touch with Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola on the phone in order to return the purse. (Trial Tr., p.413, Ls.10-24.) 
Ms. Satcher told Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola her name, and that she found Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola's purse. (Trial Tr., p.419, Ls.3-7.) Ms. Satcher testified that she was originally 
unaware that there were any credit cards in the purse, but that she confirmed for 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola on the phone that the credit cards were still in the purse when 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola told Ms. Satcher where in the purse the cards would be located. 
(Trial Tr., p.419, Ls.15-19.) Finally, Ms. Satcher was in the process of making 
arrangements to return the purse to Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola at the time the van she was 
riding in was pulled over by police. (Trial Tr., p.420, L.8 - p.421, L.3.) 
None of the State's evidence in any way refuted Ms. Satcher's account of events. 
To the contrary, the State's evidence actually corroborated several aspects of her 
testimony. Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that Ms. Satcher actually did call her to 
return the purse, and that this call was only about two hours after the purse was left 
behind by Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola in the Walmart parking lot. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.2-13.) 
She also confirmed Ms. Satcher's account that Ms. Satcher identified herself directly to 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.24-25.) Just as Ms. Satcher had testified, 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola likewise testified that she had asked Ms. Satcher whether the 
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credit cards were still inside the purse, which was confirmed by Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., 
p.187, Ls.14-19.) Finally, her testimony further corroborated that Ms. Satcher 
expressed the desire to return the lost purse and was trying to make arrangements to 
do so when the phone call was cut short. (Trial Tr., p.187, L.25 - p.188, L.8.) 
Even if the jury were to disregard Ms. Satcher's testimony in its entirety, the 
testimony of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola, standing alone, demonstrates that Ms. Satcher 
had actually made reasonable efforts to return the purse and its contents to its owner. 
In light of this, the State presented not only insufficient evidence, but no evidence, upon 
which to sustain the essential element that Ms. Satcher had failed to make reasonable 
efforts to return the property to its owner. 
2. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support A Finding, Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt, That Ms. Satcher Had The Requisite Intent To 
Support The Charge Of Grand Theft In This Case At The Time Of The 
Alleged Taking Of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's Purse, Nor At Any Other Point 
In Time 
The underlying theft that Ms. Satcher was alleged to have committed has, as an 
essential element, an intent requirement. See I.C. § 18-2403. This intent element 
placed the burden on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Satcher 
either had the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property alleged to have 
been wrongfully taken, or had the intent to appropriate that property to the defendant or 
a third person. Id. 
With regard to allegations of theft offenses, the requisite intent must be proved to 
exist at the time of the alleged taking - even evidence that the defendant subsequently 
developed the required intent will not suffice. See, e.g., State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55, 
60 (1960); State v. Huskinson, 71 Idaho 82, 87 (1952); State v. Riggs, 8 Idaho 630, 70 
P. 947, 951 (1902). "The principle is well settled that the felonious intent must exist at 
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the time of the taking." Hopple, 83 Idaho at 60. Ms. Satcher asserts that there was no 
evidence that would support the intent element of the theft alleged in this case, and 
therefore her conviction should be reversed with prejudice. 
It is entirely undisputed in this case that the only evidence of appropriation or use 
of one of the credit cards from Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse showed that it was 
someone other than Ms. Satcher that used the card. (Trial Tr., p.306, L.16 - p.311, 
L.5.) And it was Mr. Miner's appropriation that formed the basis of the State's allegation 
that Ms. Satcher appropriated Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's financial transaction card for the 
use of another. Under the case law, the State had the burden to show that Ms. Satcher 
had the intent to appropriate the purse and its contents for Mr. Miner's use at the time of 
the initial taking of the purse from the Walmart parking lot. However, none of the 
evidence in this case supports such an inference. 
As was just noted, Ms. Satcher made extensive efforts from the moment she first 
found the purse that was left behind in the parking lot in order to return the purse to its 
owner. (Trial Tr., p.410, L.12 - p.421, L.3.) Much of Ms. Satcher's account of these 
efforts was corroborated by Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola at trial. (Trial Tr., p.186, L.2 -
p.188, L.8.) The evidence at Ms. Satcher's trial demonstrates actions that are 
fundamentally inconsistent with an individual harboring an intent to permanently deprive 
the owner of the property, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola, of her purse or her financial 
transaction cards. 
Additionally, the evidence at trial, which was not directly contradicted, was that 
Ms. Satcher was entirely unaware that Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse contained any 
financial transaction cards until speaking on the phone with her. (Trial Tr., p.419, L.15-
p.420, L.7.) As such, Ms. Satcher could not have formed the specific intent to 
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appropriate Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's financial transaction card for Mr. Miner's use at the 
time of the alleged taking because Ms. Satcher did not have any awareness that there 
were any credit cards in the purse until being informed of them by Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola. 
A review of all of the evidence in this case shows that the State presented no 
proof that Ms. Satcher harbored the intent to permanently deprive Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola of her purse or credit card at the time Ms. Satcher found the purse that was 
left behind in the store parking lot. There was likewise no evidence that Ms. Satcher 
had the intent to appropriate this purse or its contents for Mr. Miner's use when it was 
found. As such, the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain the grand theft 
conviction in this case. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State, Over Ms. Satcher's Objection, To 
Elicit Testimony From A Police Officer As To His Opinion Of Whether Ms. Satcher's 
Denial Of Guilt Was Truthful 
A. Introduction 
The district court, over Ms. Satcher's objection, permitted one of the State's 
witnesses to testify as to his opinion that Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of 
the charged offense. In doing so, the district court erroneously determined both that 
such testimony was permissible, and that it would assist the jury in its ultimate 
determination regarding the State's charge. This was clear and reversible error, 
especially in light of the fact that there was no direct evidence tying Ms. Satcher to any 
use of the financial transaction card that was the subject of the State's grand theft 
charge in this case. 
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Moreover, the district court later clarified its belief that it was not permitted to 
determine whether the testimony at issue - coming from Detective Kendall - was in the 
form of expert testimony, and noted that the court never made a finding that the 
detective was qualified to testify as an expert. Because this determination lies with the 
district court - and not the jury, as the court appeared to believe - the court's refusal to 
make this determination constituted an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard of Review 
'The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence, and its decision to admit evidence will be reversed only where there has been 
a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521 
(2003). It is a matter of the discretion of the trial court to determine whether or not a 
witness is properly qualified to present testimony as an expert in a particular case. Id. 
This Court applies a three-part test with regard to the question of whether the district 
court abused its discretion. First, this Court examines whether the district court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion. Id. Second, this Court reviews 
whether the district court acted within the proper bounds of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards that are attendant on its determination. Id. Finally, 
this Court must determine whether the district court reached its discretionary 
determination through an exercise of reason. Where the defendant objects to the error 
at issue on appeal, the State bears the burden of establishing that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State. Over Ms. Satcher's 
Objection. To Elicit Testimony From A Police Officer As To His Opinion Of 
Whether Ms. Satcher's Denial Of Guilt Was Truthful 
In this case, the district court expressly permitted one of the State's witnesses, 
Detective Kendall, to testify directly as to his opinion of whether Ms. Satcher was being 
truthful when she denied guilt of the charged offense in this case. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.5 -
p.323, L.15.) And the district court did so despite multiple objections by Ms. Satcher 
that this testimony was an improper comment on credibility and that it invaded on the 
province of the jury. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.8 - p.322, L.14.) The court's basis for doing so 
was the trial court's erroneous belief that such testimony would "assist the trier of fact." 
(Trial Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.10.) Ms. Satcher asserts that this ruling was a clear 
abuse of discretion, both because the court's ruling is not in accord with clear legal 
standards regarding such testimony and because the court's determination was not 
reached in accordance with reason. 
It is clear, black-letter law that one witness is not permitted to testify as to his or 
her opinion as to the truthfulness or credibility of another witness, as this is a direct 
invasion of the jury's function in determining credibility and further does not assist the 
trier of fact. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 229; State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 468 
(2007); Perry, 139 Idaho at 525; State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 768-769 (1993); 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 55 (1990); People v. Barnes, 2 Idaho 148, 150, 9 P. 
532, 533 ( 1886). 
Various formulations of this rule from prior case law have been set forth in the 
Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Perry: 
Idaho courts have routinely held that "an expert's opinion, in a proper 
case, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would 
require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of 
disputed evidence. To venture past that point, however, is to usurp the 
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jury's function." "It is the jury's function to assess the demeanor of the 
witnesses and make a determination of credibility ... This Court will not 
second guess the jury's determination on credibility or the weight to be 
given to the witnesses' testimony." "[S]tatements by a witness as to 
whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited." 
Perry, 139 Idaho at 525 (internal citations omitted). 
In an unrelated Perry opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that this rule has 
existed for over one hundred years, emerging from a time that predated actual 
statehood in Idaho. "The Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho stated over one-
hundred years ago, that a question calling "for the opinion of one witness as to the 
truthfulness of another ... is clearly an invasion of the province of the jury, who are the 
judges of the credibility of witnesses." Perry, 150 Idaho at 229 (quoting People v. 
Barnes, 2 Idaho 148, 150 (1886)). The Court noted that, regardless of whether the 
testimony regarding the truthfulness of another witness comes from a witness giving lay 
testimony or one providing expert testimony, this type of testimony is always prohibited. 
Id. 
Ms. Satcher notes that even polygraph examinations, which appear to be based 
on scientific metrics that are certainly more reliable than observations of fidgety 
behavior such as scratching an arm or crossing one's legs or playing with one's hair 
(relating the gestures that Detective Kendall relied upon in opining that Ms. Satcher was 
not telling the truth), have been rejected as an appropriate subject matter upon which to 
opine as to the truthfulness of a witness. See Perry, 139 Idaho at 522-525; see also 
Trial Tr., p.316, L.19 - p.317, L.14 Notably, the Perry Court determined that testimony 
purportedly based on the body's involuntary physiological responses to questioning in 
order to establish truthfulness is not helpful to the jury in determining material issues of 
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fact. This type of evidence merely serves to bolster issues of credibility - an area that 
the jury has the sole province to determine. Id. at 525. 
This issue was addressed more squarely in the Christiansen opinion, which dealt 
with testimony from an officer as to the body language of the defendant that indicated 
deception. This testimony was deemed, in and of itself, to be improper because it 
suggested or inferred an opinion as to the defendant's ultimate veracity. 3 See 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 467-468. The testimony of the officer in Christiansen, as set 
forth in the opinion, is virtually identical in nearly every aspect to that presented by 
Detective Kendall in this case in support of his testimony that Ms. Satcher was lying 
when she denied guilt. Id. at 468; compare with Trial Tr., p.316, L.1 - p.317, L.18. 
Notably, the officer in Christiansen - unlike Detective Kendall in this case - was not 
permitted by the trial court to answer directly the question as to whether he believed the 
defendant was lying or to the specific things the officer noted about the defendant's 
behavior during the interview with police. Id. Despite this, the Christiansen Court held 
that the evidence presented was clearly an impermissible comment on the defendant's 
veracity. Id. at 468-469. The Court held: 
3 The issue of the prosecutor's improper questions regarding a police officer's opinion 
as to the defendant's veracity was addressed in Christiansen within the context of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 467-469. While the 
Christiansen Court did not find that the defendant had established error in the denial of 
this motion for a new trial, it was not because the Court found that the prosecutor's 
questioning was in any way proper. Rather, the Court's holding regarding the denial of 
the motion for a new trial was based on the fact that the record in Christiansen revealed 
nothing to indicate that the trial court could have anticipated the improper questioning by 
the State. Id. at 469. This stands in stark contrast to this case, where the trial court not 
only was well aware that the State was attempted to elicit the improper testimony at 
issue, but was further alerted specifically to the impropriety of the testimony and 
specifically ruled on the issue. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.5 - p.323, L.15.) 
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It makes no difference whether the opinion as to veracity is based upon 
polygraph results or upon observations of body language. In both cases it 
invades upon the province of the jury. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469. 
In light of the foregoing cases, Ms. Satcher asserts that the district court's ruling 
permitting this questioning was plainly erroneous. 
In this case, following his testimony regarding certain physical acts and 
demeanors of Ms. Satcher's that the officer thought were consistent with deception, the 
prosecutor in this case asked Detective Kendall, "Sir, based on your training and 
experience as a detective in interrogations, was Ms. Satcher being truthful?" (Trial 
Tr., p.320, Ls.5-7 (emphasis added)). Ms. Satcher immediately objected as to this 
comment on credibility and its invasion on the jury's province. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.8-
11.) The district court, apparently in the belief that there was a distinction between the 
two, attempted to clarify from the State as to whether they were asking the witness for 
an opinion about Ms. Satcher's truthfulness, or were rather asking about her credibility. 
(Trial Tr., p.320, L.20 - p.321, L.9.) 
The State was then permitted to rephrase and ask this same question a second 
time in front of the jury - and Ms. Satcher once again objected on the same grounds. 
(Trial Tr., p.321, L.15 - p.322, L.14.) At this point, the district court ruled that the 
officer's opinion about whether Ms. Satcher was truthful in her account of events to 
police was helpful to the jury and was an appropriate subject for the State's questioning. 
(Trial Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.10.) Thereafter, the State was allowed to ask the 
detective a third time whether he had an opinion as to Ms. Satcher's truthfulness, and 
what that opinion was: 
Q: Detective, what -- what opinion did you form as to whether 
Ms. Satcher was being truthful with you during the interrogation? 
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A: I did not feel she was being truthful. 
(Trial Tr., p.323, Ls.12-15.) 
The district court's determination to permit Detective Kendall to testify as to his 
opinion that Ms. Satcher was not being truthful when she denied guilt or involvement in 
the charged offense - and the court's finding that such testimony would assist the jury in 
this case - was error of the plainest sort. Moreover, this error cannot be said to be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State had no direct evidence that 
Ms. Satcher was even aware that there were any credit cards in Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola's purse - much less that she had any knowledge of Mr. Miner's alleged use of 
this card, and certainly not that she intended to appropriate the financial transaction 
card for his use. 
The only evidence presented at all as to what happened with Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola's purse after it was discovered by Ms. Satcher came from Ms. Satcher herself. 
None of the State's evidence directly refuted her account of events. As such, the 
primary basis upon which the State gave the jurors any ground to disregard 
Ms. Satcher's testimony was the testimony of Detective Kendall that, in his expert 
opinion, she was lying in this version of events. Because this is the primary evidentiary 
basis set forth by the State for refuting Ms. Satcher's account of the facts, the erroneous 
admission of this evidence cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Expressly Declined To Determine Whether 
Detective Kendall Qualified As An Expert Witness, For Purposes Of Both I.R.E. 
701 And I.R.E. 702, Prior To Permitting The Detective To Present Unqualified 
Opinion Testimony To The Jury 
As an additional matter, the district court in this case expressly stated - twice -
that it lacked the discretion to determine whether Detective Kendall was sufficiently 
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qualified to present expert testimony in Ms. Satcher's criminal case. Ms. Satcher 
asserts that this is yet another evidentiary error and abuse of discretion. Under the 
rules of evidence, lay witnesses may only testify as to certain matters at trial, and 
experts are permitted to testify as to other issues. Because the trial court is directly 
tasked with determining whether testimony has a sufficient foundation to qualify as 
expert testimony, the district court abused its discretion when the court found that it was 
outside the role of the trial court to make a determination as to whether a witness may 
testify as an expert. 
The district court in this case twice expressly disavowed both that it had found 
Detective Kendall qualified to present expert testimony to the jury and that it was within 
the district court's proper role and discretion to do so. In ruling on Ms. Satcher's 
objection to the detective's opinion testimony as to her truthfulness, the district court 
held that, "it's going to be up to the jury whether this witness is an expert." (Trial Tr., 
p.323, Ls.5-6.) The district court's failure to recognize that it had the discretion - and 
the obligation - to make the determination as to whether a witness is qualified to 
present expert testimony was further apparent at a later point in the proceedings: 
Let me be clear about -- I didn't certify anybody as an expert. The -- the 
jury decides who's expert, who's not, whether to believe them and what --
and who not to believe. 
So I -- I never said to the jury, and don't intend to say to the jury, that this 
person is an expert, or is any other person [sic]. Ultimately, that's all jury 
material. They decide, they assess credibility or not. But I do think that 
the officer's -- this witness' assessment of whether or not the defendant 
was telling the truth to him on this occasion was helpful to the jury, and 
was -- is within the scope of his training. It's up to the jury whether they --
to believe -- to be impressed by his training, feeling he's got some 
expertise or -- and, ultimately, his credibility. So, that was my intention 
and how I ruled there, and that's my view of the law. 
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(Trial Tr., p.333, L.10 - p.334, L.6.) 
Underpinning the district court's rationale for why the court did not believe that it 
had the authority to determine whether a witness qualified as an expert for purposes of 
determining the admissibility of evidence appears to be confusion between such a 
determination and the jury's power to assess the credibility of the evidence. However, it 
is not only within the court's discretion, but it is the trial court's obligation, to determine 
whether a witness is qualified to give expert testimony under the evidentiary rules. 
Because the district court failed to recognize this issue as being one within its 
discretion, and expressly disavowed making any finding that Detective Kendall was 
qualified to give any expert opinion testimony, Ms. Satcher asserts an additional abuse 
of discretion in the admission of the officer's testimony. 
The issue of whether a witness should be permitted to give expert testimony is 
committed to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 
410, 413-414 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether a witness has been properly qualified as an 
expert is a threshold matter for the trial court's determination in part because, under the 
rules of evidence, there are different matters to which a lay witness and an expert 
witness may testify and different standards that govern what the basis of that testimony 
may be. See Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414; State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 855 
(Ct. App. 1991 ); I.R.E. 701, 702. Additionally, this determination must be made by the 
district court before allowing any purported expert testimony to be admitted into 
evidence before the jury. State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855 (1992); Johnson, 119 
Idaho at 855. 
The district court in this case - by its own account - refused to make a 
determination as to whether Detective Kendall was qualified to render expert opinion 
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testimony at trial, largely because the trial court appears not to have realized that it was 
a matter of the court's discretion to do so. As such, admission of any expert opinion 
testimony from the detective was improper in this case. 
111. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Intentionally Elicited Testimony From 
One Witness Regarding His Opinion Of Ms. Satcher's Truthfulness In Denying Guilt Of 
The Charged Offense 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in this case intentionally elicited improper opinion testimony from 
Detective Kendall regarding his opinion as to whether Ms. Satcher was being truthful 
when she denied involvement in the alleged theft in this case. The prosecutor persisted 
in this line of questioning even after being put on notice by Ms. Satcher that this type of 
questioning was plainly improper. Because Ms. Satcher's veracity was potentially the 
most critical issue for the jury in adjudicating this case, the plainly improper actions of 
the prosecutor in this case cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be harmless. 
B. Standard of Review 
For alleged acts of misconduct followed by a contemporaneous objection, this 
Court must make two determinations: first, whether misconduct occurred; and, second, 
whether this misconduct was harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 220. However, the State 
bears the burden of showing to the reviewing court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id. at 228. 
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C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Intentionally Elicited Testimony 
From One Witness Regarding His Opinion Of Ms. Satcher's Truthfulness In 
Denying Guilt Of The Charged Offense 
As has been noted, it is plainly improper to elicit testimony from one witness 
asking for any opinion as to the truthfulness or veracity of another witness. See Point 
ll(C) supra. In addition to being an evidentiary error, the elicitation of such testimony by 
a prosecutor also constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. 
Numerous decisions have made abundantly clear that it is misconduct for a 
prosecutor to elicit testimony from a witness expressing an opinion as to the truthfulness 
or credibility of another witness. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; Christiansen, 144 
Idaho at 468-469; see also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011) (finding that, 
where State officer testifies as to improper opinion testimony at trial, Court would have 
found prosecutorial misconduct had misconduct been alleged in addition to evidentiary 
error). 
The prosecutor in this case asked Detective Kendall three times whether he 
believed, based upon his training and expertise, that Ms. Satcher was lying during the 
police interrogation in which she denied guilt of the charged offense. (Trial Tr., p.320, 
Ls.5-7; p.321, Ls.15-25; p.323, Ls.12-15.) The detective was actually permitted to 
answer this question the final time it was posed by the prosecutor in this case. (Trial 
Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.15.) Ms. Satcher submits that it constituted reversible 
misconduct for the prosecutor to question the detective on these matters each time the 
question was posed by the State. 
The Christiansen Opinion makes clear that even testimony that falls short of that 
elicited in this case - which directly called upon Detective Kendall to give an opinion as 
to whether Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of the charged offense -
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constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. The testimony at issue in Christiansen is 
strikingly similar to earlier testimony provided by Detective Kendall in this case, which 
listed various physical tics or actions as being indicators of deception. Christiansen, 
144 Idaho at 468. The Court in Christiansen held that this type of questioning was 
"clearly improper," because the officer's opinion as to the defendant's veracity, "was 
clearly inadmissible." Id. The Christiansen Court further elaborated on the fact that the 
elicitation of this testimony constituted misconduct: 
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant 
has a fair trial, and nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the 
jury." They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they 
can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they 
transgress upon the rights of the accused." Prosecutorial misconduct 
includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury 
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the question 
asked. 
Id. at 469. 
The misconduct in this case was not harmless, for the reasons previously 
articulated regarding the court's erroneous introduction of this evidence. See Point ll(C) 
supra. It is also noteworthy in this case that, even though the detective was only 
permitted to answer the question once, the prosecutor was allowed to ask the question 
of whether the detective believed that Ms. Satcher was being truthful three times. (Trial 
Tr., p.320, L.5 - p.323, L.15.) As noted by the Court in Christiansen, even the act of 
posing the question where the answer is inadmissible constitutes misconduct where the 
jury can infer the answer from the question asked. Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469. 
Therefore, each of the State's repeated iterations of this same improper question calling 
for an opinion as to veracity constituted a separate act of misconduct, each of which 
prejudiced Ms. Satcher in this case. 
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IV. 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence In The Form Of A Restitution Order 
Under The Auspices Of l.R.E. 609 Where The Restitution Order Was Not A Criminal 
Conviction And Was Not Admitted For Any Purpose Related To Ms. Satcher's 
Credibility 
A. Introduction 
The district court in this case, under the auspices of I.R.E. 609, ruled that 
evidence of a fact other than a criminal conviction would be admissible for a purpose 
other than her credibility if she testified that she was not involved in the use of the 
financial transaction card at issue in this case. Specifically, the district court ruled that a 
restitution order from a prior grand theft case that was ordered to be joint and several 
with Mr. Miner would be admissible under I.R.E. 609 to show Ms. Satcher might have 
known, "that maybe [Mr. Miner] would use the card that she had just taken," if 
Ms. Satcher testified that she was not aware of or involved ln Mr. Miner's alleged use of 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card. This type of evidence is plainly outside the scope 
of admissible evidence under I.R.E. 609, and is further inadmissible evidence for the 
purpose identified by the district court to show Ms. Satcher's propensity to commit 
similar offenses. 
8. Standard of Review 
As previously noted, the decision as to whether to admit or exclude evidence is 
generally reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. Perry, 139 Idaho at 52. 
Additionally, where, as here, the defendant objects to the error at issue on appeal, the 
State bears the burden of establishing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence In The Form Of A Restitution 
Order Under The Auspices Of I.R.E. 609 Where The Restitution Order Was Not 
A Criminal Conviction And Was Not Admitted For Any Purpose Related To Ms. 
Satcher's Credibility 
1. The District Court Erred When It Ruled That The State Would Be 
Permitted To Introduce Evidence Of A Prior Joint Restitution Order 
Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Under I.R.E. 609 Because The 
Restitution Order Was Not A Criminal Conviction, And Therefore Was Not 
Admissible Under This Rule, And Because This Restitution Order Was 
Only Deemed Admissible For A Purpose Unrelated To Ms. Satcher 
General Credibility As A Witness 
The district court in Ms. Satcher's case ruled that evidence of a restitution order 
from a prior criminal case, that created joint and several liability between Ms. Satcher 
and Mr. Miner, could come in under I.R.E. 609 in order to show that Ms. Satcher might 
have known, "that maybe [Mr. Miner] would use the card that she had just taken." (Trial 
Tr., p.358, L.25 - p.370, L.11.) Despite Ms. Satcher's multiple objections to admitting 
this evidence, the court nevertheless persisted in its determination of admissibility under 
I.R.E. 609. (Trial Tr., p.358, L.25 - p.373, L.9.) Ms. Satcher asserts that this was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Under the plain language of I.R.E. 609, there are two conditional prerequisites to 
the admission of impeachment evidence under this rule: the evidence being used to 
impeach the witness must be evidence of a prior felony conviction and that evidence 
must be admitted for its relevance to the issue of the general credibility of the witness. 
See, e.g., I.R.E. 609; State v. Franco, 128 Idaho 815, 817-818 (Ct. App. 1996). Neither 
of these prerequisites was met in the district court's order in this case. 
As a threshold matter, a restitution order is not a criminal conviction. This much 
was noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 834 (Ct. 
App. 2010). In fact, the court in Mosqueda went so far as to hold that restitution 
proceedings are civil proceedings that are, "distinct from the criminal case." Id. As 
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previously noted, I.R.E. 609 only operates to render prior felony convictions admissible 
for impeachment purposes. And Ms. Satcher specifically drew to the court's attention 
the fact that the evidence at issue was evidence of a restitution order, which was not a 
prior conviction for purposes of admissibility under I.R.E. 609. (Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.5-8.) 
Because the restitution order that was previously ordered jointly against Ms. Satcher 
and Mr. Miner was not a prior felony conviction, it could not have been admissible under 
this rule. 
In addition, admission of this evidence under I.R.E. 609 was error because the 
rationale for its admissibility by the district court was for a basis other than Ms. Satcher's 
general credibility. The district court found this evidence to be admissible to show that 
Ms. Satcher might have known, "that maybe [IVlr. Miner] would use the card that she 
had just taken." (Trial Tr., p.358, L.25 - p.370, L.11.) This is not a permissible basis for 
admissibility under I.R.E. 609. 
The Idaho Supreme Court made this clear in its opinion in State v. Fernandez, 
which dealt with a related question of the admissibility of evidence for purposes of 
impeachment under I.R.E. 608. See State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-384 
(1993). There, the Court found that the specific conduct at issue - an alleged prior drug 
transaction - was not, in and of itself, probative of issues regarding credibility. Id. at 
383. In the same way, evidence that Ms. Satcher had a restitution order in common 
with IVlr. Miner does not, in and of itself, have any relevance to issues of credibility at all. 
The only function the introduction of this evidence served at trial was to place in the 
minds of the jurors the insinuation that Ms. Satcher had done something criminal in the 
past in conjunction with Mr. Miner. In other words, the only real function of this 
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evidence was to suggest Ms. Satcher's propensity to engage in criminal conduct with 
Mr. Miner. 
Further, the State cannot demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that this error 
was harmless. The opinion of the Court in Fernandez is likewise instructive on this 
point. Where the evidence that was erroneously admitted carried with it the likelihood 
that the jury would infer the defendant's criminal propensity from that evidence, a 
reviewing court cannot declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such error is harmless. 
Fernandez, 124 Idaho at 383-384. In light of this prejudice, the Court in Fernandez held 
that erroneous admission of the evidence required reversal. Id. This Court should do 
the same. 
2. The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of A Prior Restitution Order 
Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Because This Evidence Was 
Irrelevant To The Charges In Her Criminal Case 
In asserting that the restitution order from the prior criminal case should not be 
admitted, Ms. Satcher expressly objected to this evidence as being irrelevant to her 
current charge, asserting, "That's got nothing to do with this case, Judge." (Trial Tr., 
p.361, Ls.21-22; p.365, Ls.1-1 O; p.366, Ls.21-25.) 
The general rule is that relevant evidence is admissible, and evidence that is not 
relevant is not admissible. See 1.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency 
to make any fact that is of consequence to the issues at trial more or less probable. 
l.R.E. 401. However, an exception to this general rule emerges when the sole basis 
upon which any relevance of the evidence may be predicated is the criminal propensity 
of the defendant. Such proof cannot provide the basis for finding that evidence is 
relevant, and therefore admissible, at trial. See State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). 
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As is discussed more fully below, the only theory of relevance behind the district 
court's rationale for introducing evidence of Ms. Satcher's prior restitution order 
expressly embraces an improper inference of propensity. Without the inference of 
criminal propensity, there is simply no relevance of a restitution order from another case 
to the disputed issues regarding Ms. Satcher's theft charge. Because this evidence was 
not relevant to the issues in Ms. Satchr's trial, this evidence should not have been 
admitted under 1.R.E. 402. 
3. The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of A Prior Restitution Order 
Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Because This Evidence, Admitted 
For The Purpose Of Showing That Ms. Satcher Should Have Known That 
Mr. Miner Would Appropriate IVls. Ostolasa-Mendiola's Financial 
Transaction Card To His Own Use, Was Impermissible Propensity 
Evidence As Prohibited Under I.R.E. 404(b) 
Among the reasons for Ms. Satcher's multiple objections to the admission of 
evidence of the prior restitution order was that this evidence related to conduct so 
similar that alleged in her charged offense that it would violate her right to a fair trial to 
admit the evidence. (Trial Tr., p.363, Ls.2-10.) A review of the district court's rationale 
for admission of the disputed evidence reveals this objection to be well-founded. 
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is generally inadmissible in order to 
show criminal propensity or guilt of the crime charged. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49, 52 (2009); State v. Naranjo,_ P.3d _,_Idaho_, 2011 WL 2937162, 
*3, *7 (Ct. App. 2011)4; State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34 (Ct. App. 1988). However, this 
appears to be precisely the rationale embraced by the district court when it determined 
that evidence of Ms. Satcher's prior restitution order was admissible. 
4 The Court of Appeals' opinion in Naranjo has not yet been released for publication in 
the permanent law reports, and is therefore subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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In finding that the prior restitution order, entered jointly against Ms. Satcher and 
Mr. Miner, was admissible to show the possibility that Ms. Satcher could have inferred, 
"that maybe [Mr. Miner] would use the card that she had just taken," the district court 
was doing nothing more than placing before the jury evidence of Ms. Satcher's 
propensity to engage in criminal activity with Mr. Miner. The sole inference to support 
the district court's purported theory of relevance can be stated as follows - Ms. Satcher 
committed a criminal offense jointly with Mr. Miner before, and therefore it is more likely 
that she did so in this case. Such an inference is plainly improper. 
The district court found that evidence of the prior restitution order entered jointly 
against Ms. Satcher and Mr. Miner was admissible for a purpose that is not permitted 
under the evidentiary rules. 5 Accordingly, the admission of this evidence by the court 
was error. 
4. The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of The Prior Restitution 
Order Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Because The Potential For 
Prejudice Of This Evidence Greatly Outweighed Any Probative Value 
Under I.R.E. 403 And 609 
Additionally, Ms. Satcher repeatedly objected to the admission of evidence 
regarding the prior restitution order for which she was jointly liable with Mr. Miner on the 
grounds that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and had substantial potential to 
confuse the jury regarding the issues at trial. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.18-20; p.363, Ls.2-1 O; 
p.364, Ls.19-22; p.365, Ls.1-19; 368, Ls.1-6; p.369, L.14- p.370, L.370.) 
Under both l.R.E. 403 and I.R.E. 609, the district court must weigh whether the 
potential for prejudice of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value in 
5 As an additional matter, the prior restitution order entered against Ms. Satcher would 
not have been admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) as the State never provided any notice at 
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determining whether that evidence should be admitted at trial. See I.R.E. 403, I.R.E. 
609; Franco, 128 Idaho at 818. 
As has been noted, the evidence of Ms. Satcher's prior restitution order had no 
relevance at all to the material issues at her trial. Therefore, there was no 
probativeness to this evidence with regard to the material issues in Ms. Satcher's trial. 
Additionally, in light of the likelihood that the jury would infer criminal propensity from 
this evidence, the potential for prejudice was very high. In light of this, error for the 
district court to admit evidence of the prior restitution order in this case because the 
potential for prejudice of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative value. 
V. 
The Cumulative Error Doctrine Requires Reversal In This Case 
Ms. Satcher asserts that each of the trial errors at issue in this appeal, standing 
alone, warrant reversal in this case. But even assuming that this Court determines that 
none of the errors individually warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors 
deprived Ms. Satcher of her due process right to a fair trial and therefore reversal is 
required. 
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
230. In this case, there were multiple errors occurring at trial, each one impacting on 
Ms. Satcher's right to a fair trial. Given the existence of so many trial errors, the fact 
that each of the above-noted errors had substantial impact on Ms. Satcher's due 
process right to fairness in her criminal proceedings, and the overall weakness of the 
all of its intent to introduce this evidence at trial. See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 
229-230 (2008). 
38 
State's evidence in this case, Ms. Satcher asserts that the cumulative effect of the 
errors in her case require reversal of her conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Satcher respectfully requests that this Court reverse her conviction for grand 
theft with prejudice in light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to support this 
charge. In the alternative, Ms. Satcher respectfully requests that this Court reverse her 
judgment of conviction and sentence for grand theft and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 20 th day of October, 2011. 
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